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STATE CONTROL OF AERONAUTICS IN 1931*
CARL ZOLLMANNt
The passage by Congress of the Air Commerce Act of 1926
removed from the power of the various states the regulation of
interstate flying but left the subject of intrastate flying untouched.
In 1926 a number of the states had more or less extensive statutes
on the subject. Massachusetts and Connecticut (the latter under
the leadership of former Chief Justice Baldwin) had been the
pioneers in this field and had found followers. Most of this legis-
lation though it covered interstate as well as intrastate flying was
not hostile to any prospective action by Congress. Some of it
actually was enacted with the very view of filling the void only
until Congress could act. Thus the statute of California passed
in 1921 provided that "until the Congress of the United States
passes legislation to control and direct the operation of all aircraft
over all the territory and territorial waters of the United States,
at which time the provisions of this act shall automatically cease
and become void, all aircraft operating within the geographical
limits of the state of California shall be governed by the provisions
hereof."' A statute of Florida passed in 1925 provided that such
act shall remain in effect "until the Congress of the United States
passes legislation of a Federal nature directing the operation of
aircraft over all the territory of the United States."'2
When Congress decided to bottom the Air Commerce Act on
the interstate commerce clause rather than on the admiralty, or
treaty or war clause (all of which had been proposed by zealous
advocates) it distinctly made the subject of intrastate flying a state
matter. That a more or less pronounced variation in the policy
of the forty-eight states would result from this situation was a
foregone conclusion. Professor Rolfing, in his recent work on Na-
tional Regulation of Aeronautics, divides the states, at the be-
ginning of 1931, into the following five groups: (1) Twenty-one
states, namely, Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
*Paper presented before the Round Table Conference on Public Law, at
the Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Chicago, Illinois, December 29, 1931.
tProfessor of Law, Marquette University School of Law.
1. California Statutes, 1921, Ch. 783, section 448; 1928 USAvR 448.
2. Florida Laws 1925, Ch. 11339, section 15; 1928 USAvR 481.
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Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming required federal
licenses for all aircraft and airmen flying within their jurisdiction.
(2) Nine states, namely, Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio and West Virginia re-
quired federal licenses only for aircraft and airmen engaged in
commercial flying within their jurisdiction. (3) Six states, namely,
Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon and Vir-
ginia required either a state or federal license for all aircraft and
airmen flying within their jurisdiction. (4) Six other states, namely,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania required state licenses for all aircraft and airmen within
their jurisdiction. (5) The remaining six states at the beginning
of 1931 had no requirement whatsoever. These states were Ala-
bama, Georgia, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Utah.
We need not concern ourselves unduly with the correctness of
this classification. Classifying statutes is no easy matter. It is not
surprising therefore that other compilers do not agree with Mr.
Rolfing in all particulars. By stressing minor differences it is
possible to classify the states into eight groups.3 We may however
accept Mr. Rolfing's classification with its defects, if any, and by
comparing it with the legislation passed in 1931 gain a vivid pic-
ture of the legislative trend. Three states in group five joined the
first group. They are Alabama, Oklahoma and Utah. Two states
from group four, namely, Florida and Kansas joined group one.
Oregon advanced from group three to group two. Illinois, New
Jersey, New York and Ohio changed from the second to the first
group.4  The result is that, in 1931, group five has been reduced
from six to three states; group four from six to four states; group
three from six to five states; and group two from nine to six
members. What all these groups have lost, group one has gained.
The universal tendency thus is toward group one. This movement
is by no means sectional but is as strong in the south as it is in
the north. It bids fair to sweep the states. States rights theories
seem impotent to check its onward march. An amendment of the
air commerce act by which intrastate air commerce would be drawn
into the federal sphere on the ground that it is inextricably con-
nected with interstate flying would seem therefore to be uncalled
3. See Fred. D. Fagg, Jr., "The Trend toward Federal Licensing" 2
JOURNAL OF AiR LAW 542-544.
4. For these statutes, see 1931 USAvR.
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for even if the constitutionality of such action be conceded. The
contention which the commerce department has consistently made
in favor of group one thus is bearing ample fruit.
It is obvious that group five calls for no government machin-
ery. It is further obvious that groups one and two can manage
to do without any such machinery, since the licenses required by it
are furnished by the federal authorities. However, the states in
group three and four are not able to dispense with such machinery.
If they require a state license, they must create a commission, or
a commissioner to issue such license or lodge such authority in
some existing officer or commission. A commission or commis-
sioner can be useful even in the states which could manage to get
along without such machinery. The Uniform Aeronautical Code
proposed by the committee of the American Bar Association on
Aeronautical Law enumerates the following purposes to which
such a body could devote its energies:
"(a) To encourage the establishment of airports, civil airways and
other air navigation facilities.
(b) To make recommendations to the Governor and the State Legis-
lature as to necessary legislation or action pertaining thereto.
(c) To study the possibilities for the development of air commerce and
the aeronautical industry and trade within the State and to collect and dis-
seminate information relative thereto.
(d) To advise with the Aeronautical Branch of the Department of
Commerce and other agencies of the Federal Government, and of the Execu-
tive Branch of this state in carrying forward such research and develop-
ment work as tends to create improved air navigation facilities.
(e) To exchange with the Department of Commerce and other State
Governments through existing governmental channels information pertaining
to civil air navigation.
(f) To cooperate in the establishment and creation of civil airways and
air navigation facilities with the State Highway Commission.
(g) To enforce the rtgulations and air traffic rules promulgated as
provided hereunder through the assistance and cooperation of State and
local authorities charged with the enforcement of law in their respective
jurisdictions."5
Compilations have been made of the form which such bodies
have taken.6 Some states have separate commissions with or with-
out salary, others have a single commissioner, some work full and
others only part time and in a number of cases the duties have
devolved upon some existing board such as the highway com-
5. 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 552, 553; 1931 USAvR 272; 56 Reports of
American Bar Association ...
6. See Fred D. Fagg. Jr., "A Survey of State Aeronautical Legislation,"
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 452, 462.
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mission or the motor vehicle commission. Since uniformity in this
respects is of no particular consequence we may safely pass to the
next subject for consideration. It is far more important indeed
that such a body be thoroughly integrated with the other state
machinery than that it be more or less alike in the various states.
There is perhaps no other subject of legislation that has re-
ceived more attention within the last three or four years than that
relating to airports. The United States Aviation Reports for the
years 1929, 1930 and 1931 contain 828 pages of state legislation
in regard to aviation. Of this mass, apparently more than half
relates to airports. Something like 2000 such airports in various
stages of development are now available. Again, we need not be
very much concerned with the question of uniformity. It is more
important to procure the airports than to accomplish this result
in a uniform manner. It is more important that the taxation or
bonding provisions be workable under the established system in a
particular state than that they be uniform. To classify the mass
of legislation which now clusters around the subject would seem
to be a useless task. It can be stated however that the universal
attitude on the part of legislatures is very friendly toward airports
and that the courts take exactly the same viewpoint. The power
of a municipality to establish and maintain an airport has therefore
been sustained without hesitation and without a single exception
in the ten or fifteen cases in which the question has been presented
to the courts.
The Uniform State Law of Aeronautics proposed in 1922 by
the Commissioner on Uniform Legislation and which in 1929 had
been adopted in twenty-one states has become a battle ground
to such an extent that no state adopted the act in 1931 and one
state (Idaho) repealed its previous adoption of it. A strong as-
sault has been made on section 3 which provides that "the owner-
ship of the space above the lands and waters of this state is de-
clared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath,
subject to the right of flight described in section 4." The limited
recognition which this section accords to the old maxim Cujus est
solum eits est usque ad coeluin is the point of attack. There are
those who would wish the maxim to be destroyed in its entirety
rather than have it adapted to present needs. The Standing Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association on Aeronautical Law in
its 1931 report therefore submits a "Uniform Aeronautical Code"
copying various sections from the Unform State Law of Aero-
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nautics but omitting section four and comments on this omission
as follows:
"The committee unanimously believes, in view of exhaustive studies
made not only by this committee and its predecessors, but by other eminent
students of aviation law, and particularly by able counsel in the two im-
portant litigated cases arising since the approval of the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act, that the statement as to the ownership of airspace proclaims
a legal untruth.
"No decided case has even held that 'airspace' was 'owned' by the
landowner to unlimited heights. Indications of such a legal belief appear
by way of dicta only. It is manifest that prior to the use of aircraft and
prior to the use of upper airspaces, there could have been no authoritative
pronouncement on this subject.
"Since the arrival of aircraft and since the use of upper airspace, there
has been one indefinite indication of such pronouncement by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, and one by a Federal District Court, in a case
presently on appeal.
"It is the committee's belief, though, that enough has been said in these
cases apparently in opposition to the old pronouncement to indicate that the
broad statement as contained in the old Uniform Aeronautics Act, was, as
it stood, incorrect.
"The presence of this declaration in an Aeronautical Law Code would
simply lend color to the assertion of non-existent and unnecessary rights by
litigiously inclined persons, to the great nuisance and possible destruction of
aviation."7
On the other hand, the American Law Institute in its tenta-
tive draft on the law of torts submitted on May 7, 1931, states
that a trespass may be committeed by entering or remaining (a)
on the surface of the earth, or (b) beneath the surface thereof
or (c) above the surface thereof, and says in commenting on
clause c. "An unprivileged entry or remaining in the space above
the surface of the earth, at whatever height above the surface, is
a trespass. A temporary invasion of the air space by aircraft,
while traveling for a legitimate purpose at such a height as not
to interfere unreasonably with the possessor's enjoyment of the
surface of the earth and the air column above it, is privileged."
In the explanatory notes attached to this section, the reporter
further says: "On the whole, the Reporter and his Advisers
believe that the most satisfactory view is that the column of air
is in the possession of the possessor of the surface of the land
subject to a privilege of use by travellers, in so far as they do
not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of his premises
by the possessor."8
7. 1931 USAvR 260; 56 Reports of American Bar Association.
8. 1931 USAvR 280, 281, 287.
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Another controverted section of the Uniform State Law of
Aeronautics is section five. This reads as follows:
"The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters
of this state is absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the
land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft,
or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner was
negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or part by the negli-
gence of the person injured or of the owner or bailee of the property in-
jured. If the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to person or prop-
erty, both wrer and lessee shall be liable, and they may be sued jointly, or
either or both may be sued separately."
The objection urged against this provision is that it lays down
too stringent a rule of liability. Says the report of the standing
committee of the American Bar Association on Aeronautical Law:
"Your committee feels that this declaration of liability is, however, errone-
ous. The owner actually negligent in the operation of an aircraft is placed
upon the same footing as the owner of an aircraft forced to descent by
storm or other act of God; on the same footing as the owner whose aircraft
is forced to earth by collision resulting solely from the gross negligence of
another aircraft; on the same footing as the owner whose aircraft has been
loaned or leased to a person using it solely for his own pursuits; on the
same footing as the owner whose aircraft has been stolen from its hangar
and used without his knowledge or consent." 9
Accordingly four of the states which adopted the Uniform
Aeronautics Act in 1929 omitted this section, Montana and Missouri
absolutely, while Pennsylvania and Arizona formulated substitute
provisions. The provision of Pennsylvania is as follows:
"The owner and the operator, or either of them, of every aircraft which
is operated over the lands or waters of this Commonwealth, shall be liable
for injuries or damage to persons or property on or over the land or water
beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of aircraft, or the dropping
or falling of any object therefrom in accordance with the rules of law
applicable to torts on land in this Commonwealth."1
The Arizona substitute reads as follows:
"Each pilot shall be responsible for all damage to any person or property
caused by any aircraft directed by him or under his control, which damages
shall have resulted from the negligence of such pilot, either in controlling
such aircraft himself or while giving instructions to another, and, if such
pilot be the agent or employee of another, both he and his principal or
employer shall be responsible for such damage."11
9. 1931 USAvR 265; 56 Reports of American Bar Association.
10. Pennsylvania Law, 1929, Act 317, section 6; 1929 USAvR 752.
11. Arizona Laws, 1929, Ch. 38, section 11; 1929 USAvR 406.
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The state of Idaho in 1931 repealed the Uniform State Law
of Aeronautics and in its stead adopted another act which copies
the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute just noted. This is
also the solution adopted in the "Uniform Aeronautical Code"
proposed by the Standing Committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation on Aeronautical Law. The objection that this throws too
great a burden on the injured or damaged landowners is met by
providing in section 6 that "proof of injury inflicted to persons or
property on the ground by the operation of any aircraft, or by
objects falling or thrown therefrom, shall be prima facie evidence
of negligence on the part of the operator of such aircraft in refer-
ence to such injury." The Committee in commenting on this pro-
vision says:
"The committee recognizes, however, and deems it essential that the
inequality of the landsman and the aviator, with respect to the availability
of evidence as to what has taken place in the air, and as to what causes an
aircraft to descend out of control be adjusted. This makes it necessary that
some rule be adopted which relieves the landsman of the unequal load of
carrying the burden of proof as to negligence. This, we believe, the com-
mittee has solved in the rule announced in these sections.
"This section omits the use of the all-inclusive term of 'owner.' It
simply provides a presumption of evidence which relieves the landsman of the
burden of proving negligence by the preponderance of the evidence.
"It leaves open to the aviator, or owner, or operator, to establish the
common law defenses now pertinent to such actions, namely, the defense of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff; the defense of an act
of God; the defense of the exercise of all possible care; and as to the
owner, the defense of a lack of agency or employment relationship between
himself and the actual operator."'12
The foregoing discusses questions which at the present time
are live issues before legislative assemblies on which the policy
of the various states is in the process of being formulated. Many
pages could be filled with the odds and ends, the windings and
twistings of legislative efforts along the line of aircrqft legislation.
The writer does not believe that an attempt to weave this mass
into this paper can possibly be worth the effort. Even though a
complete picture of the present situation by way of a competent
digest of the existing legislation were accomplished no group, no
matter how intelligent, could be expected to carry away an ade-
quate image of this picture. Besides the next meeting of the
various legislatures would throw the picture completely out of
focus.
12. 1931 USAvR 266; 56 Reports of American Bar Association.
